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# THE UNITED STATES AND SANTO DOMINGO 1789-1866

(Continued)

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## CHAPTER VI

### THE UNITED STATES AND HAITI, 1810-1840

The resumption of commercial relations between the United States and Haiti in 1810 found the island divided in sovereignty. Spain had in 1809, by the aid of England, wrested the control of the eastern half of the island from France and for the next twelve years Spanish Santo Domingo continued to be a Spanish colony. In the western half of the island negro rule had been securely established, but consolidation of the country under one ruler had not yet been accomplished. During Dessalines' brief rule, he was acknowledged as the nominal head of the entire state, but his death by assassination revealed the divisions within the country, due to racial prejudices and the difficulty of communication between the different sections of Haiti.

Various claimants to power sought to establish themselves in the provinces of Haiti, but gradually authority was consolidated into the hands of two men. In the north, Henri Christophe, one of Toussaint's lieutenants, set up a despotic negro kingdom, under the title of King Henry I. Until 1820 his word was law among the negroes of the north, while his cruelty is commemorated in many a story of his reign.

In the west and south, Pétion, a mulatto leader, exercised until 1818 somewhat less arbitrary power as president of the Republic of Haiti. The contrast between the two governments established illustrates the difference in tendency between a negro and a mulatto régime in Haiti; for

a negro government tends to degenerate into an absolutism untempered by mercy, while a mulatto government is apt to develop into an inefficient oligarchy lacking in governance.

Resumption of commerce with the dominions of Christophe was not altogether profitable for American merchants. The year 1810 was an especially difficult one for American traders, for in that year Christophe had sent to the United States, \$125,000 to purchase a variety of articles, but the money was fraudulently detained there. Christophe's only resource was to requisition American merchants at Cap Français for the sum and in spite of their innocence of any connection with the transaction in question, they were compelled to reimburse the king for the loss he had suffered. This was a beginning of claims upon Christophe, which, aggravated by repeated confiscations and captures of American vessels, in a few years reached a sum estimated at several hundred thousand dollars.<sup>261</sup>

Relations with Pétion seem to have been somewhat more friendly for a mulatto régime is apt to show itself more favorable to foreign intercourse than a negro government, but even trade with the West and South had its disadvantages. In November, 1813, during our war with England, an American commercial agent was received at Port au Prince and special privileges were accorded to our privateers in Haitian harbors.<sup>262</sup> In the following August, however, Mr. Taylor wrote that "the conduct of Pétion to our Privateers, is *barely friendly*."<sup>263</sup>

In 1817 the American government determined to make a serious attempt to recover the indemnity claimed by American traders from Christophe. Septimius Tyler was dispatched to Cap Français with the title of commercial agent.<sup>264</sup> To make his mission more impressive, he was conveyed to Haiti in the frigate *Congress*, but the attempt

<sup>261</sup> 27 Cong., 3 sess., House Doc. 36, 6.

<sup>262</sup> State Department Archives, Taylor to Monroe, December 10, 1813.

<sup>263</sup> State Department Archives, Taylor to Monroe, August 30, 1814.

<sup>264</sup> 27 Cong., 3 sess., House Doc. 36, 40.

to leave him at Cap Français as a representative of the American government proved unsuccessful. The letter of credence with which he had been supplied was not in the ordinary form used in despatching commercial agents. To avoid anything like a recognition of Christophe's authority, the letter simply announced that Mr. Tyler had been named as commercial agent at Cap Français in the island of Santo Domingo. As no mention was made of his being accredited to King Henry and his court and as Cap Français had ceased to exist having been rechristened Cape Henry, while the island of Santo Domingo had been given again its old Indian name of Haiti, Christophe felt justified in refusing to receive the American commissioner.<sup>265</sup> He was rather unfairly accused of taking this course solely in order to avoid paying the three or four hundred thousand dollars demanded by the American government;<sup>266</sup> but the American disregard of ordinary diplomatic usage would seem sufficient justification for his action.

The following year another attempt was made to place a commercial agent at the court of King Henry. An American frigate was again employed to convey the American representative, William Taylor, to his post and he was given a certificate of appointment in which the words Cap Français and Santo Domingo were replaced by the new names, Cape Henry and Haiti. But as this certificate too did not recognize the independence of the Haitian government, Christophe refused to accord its bearer any official recognition. The only consolation for the American government was that England had failed too in a similar attempt.<sup>267</sup>

Pétion had proved less unwilling to receive American representatives. In 1817 William Taylor had been named as commercial agent at Port au Prince and Pétion had at that time expressed his desire to "preserve the most amicable relations with the United States."<sup>268</sup> In 1818 Commodore Lewis was received in the same capacity.

<sup>265</sup> 27 Cong., 3 sess., House Doc. 36, 117.

<sup>266</sup> Niles's *Register*, xiv, 263.

<sup>267</sup> 27 Cong., 3 sess., House Doc. 36, 117-120.

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

Pétion's death in 1818 and the suicide of Christophe in 1820 resulted in the union of Haiti under one man, Jean-Pierre Boyer and two years later the Spanish part of Santo Domingo also came under his control, which continued until 1843. It was the period of despots in the South American states and Boyer would seem to have compared not unfavorably with contemporary rulers. He was, for his time and position, enlightened and liberal. He preserved peace and order, and, in contrast with the days of revolution and bloodshed that have followed, his rule is looked back upon as Haiti's golden age. But "the quiet which marked Boyer's rule was at best only a consumptive tranquility."<sup>269</sup> He displayed the typical mulatto inability to rule. He kept peace at the expense of progress and the period of his rule was one of stagnation rather than growth. St. John has summed up the results of his régime: "After a twenty years' peace, the country is described as in a state of ruin, without trade or resources of any kind; with peculations and jobbery paramount in the public offices."<sup>270</sup> With such a ruler the United States was able to preserve some sort of diplomatic relations, though it proved a difficult task at times in the face of the determined refusal of the United States to recognize Haitian independence.

Soon after his inauguration Boyer conceived the idea of recruiting the population, decimated by constant wars, by an immigration of free blacks from the United States. It was not a new idea. Dessalines, in 1804, had offered a reward of forty dollars to American captains for every Haitian negro brought back from the United States;<sup>271</sup> and in 1821 a Maryland Haytian Society was formed by some free blacks in that state to forward their emigration to Haiti.<sup>272</sup> In 1824 Boyer began a serious attempt to bring over negroes in large numbers. Jonathan Granville was sent to New York as the agent of the Haitian government and was supplied with fifty thousand pounds of coffee

<sup>269</sup> Clark, *A Plea for Hayti*, 34.

<sup>270</sup> St. John, *op. cit.*, 84.

<sup>271</sup> *Writings of James Monroe*, iv, 186.

<sup>272</sup> *Niles's Register*, xix, 415.

to pay the expenses of the undertaking. Boyer's terms were most liberal. He promised to pay the passage of the immigrants, support them for four months, and then grant them land at the rate of thirty-six acres to every twelve laborers.<sup>273</sup> He was especially anxious for agricultural laborers and artisans of whom the country stood in need. According to Hunt some thirteen thousand negroes availed themselves of the opportunity to become established in a free country.<sup>274</sup> The result was in many respects disappointing. The immigrants seem to have expected continued support in Haiti, many came from American cities and were not adapted to the rural life of the island, and a large number, finding conditions other than their imaginations had painted, returned to the United States.

Southern opposition manifested itself to a course of action which on its face would seem to have been advantageous to the slave-owners. The principal objection to the emigration was the nearness of Haiti. Already afraid of the effect upon their own slaves of the establishment as the result of a servile revolt of a "flourishing black empire," they opposed the colonization of American negroes there lest "if this example is rendered more striking and familiar by the intercourse and communication which, in the event of colonizing in Hayti, must necessarily subsist between these colonists who shall go and their connections left behind in this country, it may add greatly to the apprehended danger."<sup>275</sup>

But it was in the following year in connection with the debate on the Panama Congress that Southern feeling in regard to Haiti was most clearly and emphatically expressed. The opposition to the Panama Mission was fundamentally a party and not a sectional opposition, stirred up by the Jackson Democrats. The interest in the congress, so far as American relations with Haiti are concerned, lies

<sup>273</sup> *Biographie de Jonathan Granville*, 92-93.

<sup>274</sup> Hunt, *Remarks on Hayti as a Place of Settlement for Afric-Americans*, 11.

<sup>275</sup> *New York American*, June 18, 1824. Quoted *Biographie de Jonathan Granville*, 116.

not so much in the fate of the mission as in the appeal made to the South by the opponents of the president and the very candid statement made in the course of the Senate debates of the Southern attitude toward the Black Republic. The action taken by the United States at this time did much to intensify the feeling of bitterness engendered in Haiti against the American government because of its refusal to recognize Haitian independence.

Salazar, the Columbian minister at Washington, in his letter of November 2, 1825, to Mr. Clay, then secretary of state, in mentioning the topics which the approaching Congress at Panama would be called upon to discuss, wrote in regard to Haiti:

On what basis the relations of Hayti and other parts of our hemisphere that shall hereafter be in like circumstances are to be placed, is a question simple at first view, but attended with serious difficulties when closely examined. These arise from the different manner of regarding Africans and from their different rights in Hayti, the United States, and in other American States. This question will be determined at the Isthmus, and, if possible, a uniform rule of conduct adopted in regard to it, or those modifications that may be demanded by circumstances.<sup>276</sup>

Though the president was opposed to the recognition at that time of Haitian independence and did not even favor a discussion of the question by the Panama Congress,<sup>277</sup> a good deal of fiery invective was launched in the Senate against Señor Salazar's proposal. Mr. Hayne of South Carolina, one of the leaders of the opposition, said:

With nothing connected with slavery can we consent to treat with other nations, and, least of all, ought we to touch the question of the independence of Hayti in conjunction with Revolutionary governments, whose own history affords an example scarcely less fatal to our repose. . . . Our policy with regard to Hayti is plain. We never can acknowledge her independence. Other states will do as they please—but let us take the high ground, that these questions belong to a class, which the peace and safety of a large portion of our Union forbids us even to discuss. Let our government direct all our ministers in South America and Mexico to *protest* against the independence

<sup>276</sup> *International American Conferences*, iv, 30.

<sup>277</sup> *Ibid.*, iv, 43, 145.

of Hayti. But let us not go into council on the slave trade and Hayti.<sup>278</sup>

Berrien of Georgia made a yet more impassioned plea against establishing any sort of relation with Haiti. To him Salazar's proposal was "one of the most odious features" of the whole affair, intercourse with Haiti would "introduce a moral contagion, compared with which physical pestilence, in the utmost imaginable degree of its horrors, would be light and insignificant;" while self-preservation would compel the South to oppose the admission of the emancipated slaves of Haiti into their ports.<sup>279</sup>

Benton of Missouri summed up the Southern answer to the request of Northern merchants for diplomatic recognition of the island with which they carried on such an extensive trade:

Our policy towards Hayti, the old San Domingo, has been fixed, Mr. President, for three and thirty years. We trade with her, but no diplomatic relations have been established between us. We purchase coffee from her, and pay her for it; but we interchange no consuls or ministers. We receive no mulatto consuls, or black ambassadors from her. And why? Because the peace of eleven states will not permit the fruits of a successful negro insurrection to be exhibited among them. It will not permit black consuls and ambassadors to establish themselves in our cities, and to parade through our country, and give their fellow blacks in the United States, proof in hand of the honors which await them, for a like successful effort on their part. It will not permit the fact to be seen, and told, that for the murder of their masters and mistresses, they are to find friends among the white people of these United States.<sup>280</sup>

Little wonder that Haiti was slow to grant commercial favors to a nation which had shown itself so opposed to entering into any political relations with her. It was difficult for the government to steer a middle course between the demands of the northern merchants that rights and privileges should be secured for them by American officials in Haiti and the opposition of the South to anything that savored of recognition. In 1820 Andrew Armstrong was

<sup>278</sup> Gales and Seaton, *Register of Debates in Congress*, ii, Pt. I, 166.

<sup>279</sup> *Ibid.*, 290-291.

<sup>280</sup> *Ibid.*, 330.



received by President Boyer as American commercial agent at Port au Prince. In 1821 W. D. Robinson was sent to Port au Prince to present the claims of Commodore Lewis against the Haitian government and was granted a letter of introduction by the secretary of state to President Boyer.<sup>281</sup> He wrote from Port au Prince:

I judge from the interviews I have already had with President Boyer and his secretary general, that they are anxious to cultivate the good will of our government, and I feel confident that if our cabinet were to offer to acknowledge the independence of Hayti, or to make a commercial treaty with them, we might make our own terms and receive satisfaction for all claims.<sup>282</sup>

In 1823 the Haitian government made a formal application for recognition of its independence,<sup>283</sup> President Monroe made no direct reply but he sent a special message to the Senate in which he discussed the Santo Domingan situation though he made no definite recommendation to the Senate as to the course which they should pursue.<sup>284</sup> This message he hoped would be a satisfactory answer to the Haitian request but it was unfortunately not published. At about the same time Niles's *Register* contained the statement, that "it is strongly recommended by many, that the United States should *officially* acknowledge a fact which really exists, *the independence of Hayti*;" though the editor himself considered recognition inexpedient because of the color prejudice in the United States.<sup>285</sup> The Boston papers in particular carried on an agitation for the recognition of Haiti as the first of all the Latin-American states to gain her independence.<sup>286</sup>

In 1824 the question of recognition came up for discussion in the cabinet on the occasion of a request by certain merchants that their agent sent down to recover claims against the Haitian government, be granted a letter from

<sup>281</sup> 27 Cong., 3 sess., House Doc. 36, 30.

<sup>282</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>283</sup> *The Writings of James Monroe*, vi, 317.

<sup>284</sup> Richardson, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, ii, 204-205.

<sup>285</sup> Niles's *Register*, xxv, 50.

<sup>286</sup> *Le Propagateur Haïtien*, July, 1822.

the secretary of state, recognizing Boyer as president of the Haitian republic. It was decided by the cabinet members that neither the time nor the method was suitable for entering upon such a course of action.<sup>287</sup> In 1825, however, Mr. Clay expressed his belief that "the independence of the Haytian government must shortly be recognized."<sup>288</sup>

In the meantime the Haitian government was making a bid for favor with Great Britain. The absence of any color prejudice in that nation and the English desire for a monopoly of Haitian commerce made the recognition of independence by England seem more probable than by any other nation. Accordingly Great Britain was granted all the advantages of the most favored nation and import duties were lowered on ships flying the English flag, to the despair of the American traders.

In 1825, Charles X of France recognized the independence of Haiti in return for certain concessions and a money indemnity of thirty million dollars. Negotiations continued between France and Haiti until 1838 before the independence of Haiti was placed on a suitable footing and the indemnity was reduced to a figure somewhat more in keeping with the resources of the little republic. But the convention of 1825 permitted Great Britain in that year, without fear of offending France, to enter into diplomatic relations with the former French colony and to send to it a consular agent.<sup>289</sup>

Thus encouraged, Boyer refused to recognize Mr. Armstrong any longer as American commercial agent and forced him to leave the country, because of the failure of the United States to recognize in return "the tawny government of Hayti."<sup>290</sup> In 1828 the United States was still without a representative in the island and Adams wrote in regard to appointing a successor to Mr. Armstrong:

<sup>287</sup> Adams, *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, vi, 233.

<sup>288</sup> *Ibid.*, vi, 530.

<sup>289</sup> St. John, *op. cit.* 82-84.

<sup>290</sup> Adams, *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, vii, 389.

The appointment, if made, must be of an informal commercial agency, and with a probable prospect of not being recognized; as they had refused to act upon representations of our last commercial agent, Andrew Armstrong, on the ground that we declined to recognize the Haytien government as sovereign and independent.<sup>291</sup>

By 1830 American representatives were again being received but despite their strenuous efforts it was long before they secured for themselves the privileges that were granted to the British and French consuls. The consular correspondence of the period seems hardly in accordance with the dignity of the American government, filled as it is with requests for extensions of consular privileges, which were not granted; with protests against laws and duties which bore unfavorably upon American trade and which were not removed; with complaints against the unjust seizure of American vessels and the unjust imprisonment of American citizens, whose wrongs were righted grudgingly if at all; and with demands for indemnities which not even a show of force could obtain.

Trade with Haiti continued, however, despite all the drawbacks. In 1822 the United States was exporting as much to Haiti as to Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland combined and more shipping entered the United States from its ports than from any other country save England, the British American colonies and Cuba.<sup>292</sup> In 1824 American imports into Haiti were estimated at "double that of all other nations and one half in the total amount of importations."<sup>293</sup> In 1838, the value of the commerce is noted as diminishing, having decreased in amount from two million dollars annually to about one million.<sup>294</sup> In 1839, however, Haiti still stands thirteenth among all the nations trading with the United States.<sup>295</sup>

In the thirties with the growth of abolition agitation, the question of recognition entered upon a new phase. To

<sup>291</sup> Adams, *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, vii, 441.

<sup>292</sup> Niles's *Register*, xx, 49.

<sup>293</sup> *Ibid.*, xxvii, 31.

<sup>294</sup> *Ibid.*, lv, 51.

<sup>295</sup> *Ibid.*, lvii, 23.

the voice of the merchants who were interested in Haitian commerce was added that of the opponents of slavery who realized that the slave-sentiment of the South stood in the way of diplomatic relations with the Black Republic. As early as 1825 petitions began to reach Congress in regard to the subject.<sup>296</sup> In 1838, when Mr. Adams began his celebrated fight in the House of Representatives against the gag-rule, which laid all petitions for the abolition of slavery on the table and forbade all discussion of that subject in the House, resolutions demanding the recognition of Haiti were substituted for those which came under the gag-rule, in order that the question of slavery might be kept before the people. In the winter of 1838–1839, more than two hundred petitions praying for the recognition of the negro republic and prompted by the Northern anti-slavery sentiment, were received by the House. The following session saw almost as many petitions and they continued to come during the years that followed.<sup>297</sup>

That they were the work of the abolition movement was well recognized by the Southern statesmen. In regard to it, H. S. Legaré in his “elaborate and impassioned speech”<sup>298</sup> of December 18, 1838, the most bitter of the speeches made at this time against the recognition of the negro state, said:

It is not for the paltry commerce of a horde of barbarians that agitation is beginning on this subject. It is because it affords a plausible pretext and a convenient opening to a continued discussion of that fatal question which has been agitated in and out of the House of late, with so much vehemence. . . . My objection against this memorial is that it aims at *abolition*—is a part of a system—is *not* for the benefit of commerce, but for the ruin of the South.

And he added the prophecy:

As sure as you live, Sir, if this course is permitted to go on, the sun of this Union will go down—it will go down in blood, and go down to rise no more. I will vote unhesitatingly against nefarious designs like these. They are treason.<sup>299</sup>

<sup>296</sup> *Boston Post*, April 8, 1862.

<sup>297</sup> Hasse, *Index to United States Documents, relating to Foreign Affairs*, i, 720–721.

<sup>298</sup> Adams, *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, x, 68.

<sup>299</sup> *Writings of Hugh Swinton Legaré*, i, 322–328.

In 1843 John Quincy Adams at a meeting of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, offered a resolution "that a Consul ought to be forthwith appointed to the republic of Hayti to prosecute the claims of our citizens." But his was the only vote in the committee in favor of the resolution, though there were three other Northern men serving with him.<sup>300</sup>

Some at least of the petitions presented to Congress had a purely commercial basis. But nowhere more clearly than in these petitions is the close connection shown between the abolition movement and the economic interests of New England. It was the New England merchants who were the principal traders to Port au Prince and their desire as merchants for the removal of restraints on that trade, which could be accomplished only by the recognition of Haitian independence, was quite sincere. But they were at the same time actuated by humanitarian motives in desiring to improve the status of the negro. As a Southern congressman expressed it, in speaking of a voluminous petition prepared by some of the most prominent Boston merchants in 1852; "With you in the North this is a matter of convenience, philanthropy, and gain to your manufacturers, etc. With *us*, it is a matter of life and death."<sup>301</sup>

With the revolt of the eastern half of the island from Boyer's rule, in 1843, and the establishment of the Dominican Republic, the attitude of the Southern statesmen toward the island of Santo Domingo changed and relations with the island were placed upon a new footing.

## CHAPTER VII

### DOMINICAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE TRIPARTITE INTERVENTION

A brief review of the relation of Spanish to French Santo Domingo is necessary to an understanding of the events of the year 1843. Discovered by Columbus, the whole island remained under nominal Spanish control until 1697, when

<sup>300</sup> Adams, *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, xi, 331-333.

<sup>301</sup> Quoted in *Boston Post*, April 8, 1862.

the western half was ceded to France. Almost a century later, in 1795, France in her dream of a great French empire controlling the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, forced from Spain a second surrender in the island, this time of the eastern half, though the formal acknowledgment was not made until Toussaint Louverture conquered Spanish Santo Domingo in the name of France. In the struggle that followed the eastern half of the island was wrested from the blacks and remained in French possession until 1809. In that year, England, fighting as an ally of Spain against the too-victorious troops of Napoleon, invaded the island from Jamaica and driving out the French forces returned the Spanish half of the island to the mother country. Security of possession was assured to Spain by the Treaty of Paris of 1814.

Seven years later, the revolutionary spirit which had already liberated the South American states, reached this oldest seat of Spanish power, and in December, 1821, Spanish Santo Domingo was declared free under the name of Columbia. But Boyer, who had consolidated Haiti under his rule, saw his opportunity and hastening into the new republic just six weeks after its establishment, demanded its abrogation and the union of the whole island under the Haitian flag. To avoid civil war, the Spanish party yielded and for twenty-two years, Santo Domingo formed one nation.<sup>302</sup>

The Haitian rule proved an unmitigated evil for Spanish Santo Domingo and she was glad to avail herself of the civil disorder in Haiti in 1843, to throw off allegiance to the Black Republic. With the era of independence, American interest in the eastern half of the island begins. For the next thirty years the history of the Dominican Republic turns on the question whether it is to remain independent or fall under the influence of some foreign power. France, England, Spain and the United States in turn showed themselves receptive to a proposal from the Dominican Republic for annexation or the establishment of a pro-

<sup>302</sup> Hazard, *Santo Domingo, Past and Present*, 156 ss. 41 Cong., 3 sess., Sen. Doc. 17, 2, 33.

tectorate and each in turn was thwarted in its desire to gain a foothold in Santo Domingo by the other three nations interested. The country itself was only a pawn played to suit the convenience of foreign interests.

In 1843 certain of the Santo Domingan leaders approached the French representatives at Port au Prince, offering to France Samana Bay, much coveted by all nations as a naval base, in exchange for aid in a revolt against Haiti. The French representatives were sympathetic and an informal agreement was reached between them and the insurgent leaders. The French government, carrying out the arrangements made by its agents, ordered Rear-Admiral Mosges and the French Gulf fleet to Santo Domingo. His arrival and that of a French consular agent at Santo Domingo City was the signal for the beginning of the revolutionary movement.<sup>303</sup> Before France could take any definite action, however, the question had assumed international proportions and the French government thereupon refused to give the assistance promised to the Dominicans from a fear of compromising itself with Great Britain.

The motives influencing France to surrender her ambitious plans are thus set forth by the *Paris Presse* for July 13, 1844:

On one part, Spain has never abandoned her rights over her ancient possession, has addressed energetic representations upon the course which has been pursued, and has made an appeal to the loyalty of France; and on the other hand, England, which is no more blind than we are to the future reserved for the Haytien republic, and which understands how to interpret the convention of 1838, wishes to extend her hand *gloved with the protectorate*, to the French part of the island, that country so beautiful and so rich, of which the Spanish part was never but an insignificant appendage. Opposed in her projects by the representations of our cabinet, England replies to us by objecting to us our own conduct. Thus it is protectorate for protectorate, with this distinction, that in running after the protectorate of the south we run the risk of seeing that of the north fall into the hands of England.<sup>304</sup>

<sup>303</sup> D'Alaux, *L'Empereur Soulouque et son Empire*, 273-274. Lepelletier de Saint-Remy, *Saint-Domingue et les nouveaux intérêts maritimes de l'Espagne*, 652. Clark, *Remarks upon United States Intervention in Hayti*, 19-20.

<sup>304</sup> Quoted in Niles's *Register*, lxvi, 413.



While rumors of French intervention were frequent in the years that followed, the result was always the same. All action was blocked by the threat of English interference.

In December, 1844, Dr. José M. Caminero was sent as a public envoy to the United States to announce the independence of the Dominican Republic and request American recognition. In answer to his request, President Tyler, in February of the following year, despatched John Hogan to the island to make a six months' investigation of conditions there and to report on the advisability of recognizing Dominican independence. In his instructions he was informed that the president was favorable to the acknowledgment of the republic.<sup>306</sup> Mr. Hogan's report, as might be expected, supported the president's point of view, emphasizing, as it did, the large proportion of white blood in the Dominican Republic and its predominance in political affairs.<sup>306</sup> His statement that the Dominican Republic had a population of 230,000, of whom over one hundred thousand were white, was, however, undoubtedly false.<sup>307</sup> Despite the repeated assertions of Southern statesmen, the eastern republic could be called white only in comparison with the western.

In regard to the international situation, Mr. Hogan wrote:

As might have been anticipated, the watchful eyes of England and France have not been closed to the interesting events which have occurred in this region. Their official and unofficial agents have been upon the spot, anxiously watching the course of events, and industrious in turning them to the advantage of their respective nations. Jealous of each other, but united in their jealousy of the United States, no means were left untried to annihilate in advance every hope on the part of this country to participate in the advantages to be derived from the present circumstances in which the republic of Dominica finds herself. . . . It is beyond all doubt, however, that they are seeking to acquire to some extent and in some way an influence over the new government and its concerns, and to accomplish these designs for their

<sup>306</sup> 41 Cong., 3 sess., Sen. Doc. 17, 33-34.

<sup>306</sup> *Ibid.*, 33-67.

<sup>307</sup> Clark, *A Plea for Hayti*, 36-37.



own special benefit, to the exclusion, as far as possible, of any participation by us.<sup>308</sup>

The change of administration prevented any immediate action from being taken. In 1846, in response to reiterated appeals for protection and recognition, President Polk sent Lieutenant Porter on another tour of investigation, much to the surprise of the Dominican government which had been so recently investigated by an American representative. On emerging from a rather extended journey through the interior of Santo Domingo, Lieutenant Porter learned of the American declaration of war against Mexico.<sup>309</sup> As a result of the war the United States was for some time too busily engaged to give any thought to the little republic in the West Indies.

In the spring of 1849 a succession of Haitian victories aroused so much fear in the Dominican Republic that application was made to both the British and the French consuls for the establishment of a protectorate. An interview was also requested with the American commercial agent at Santo Domingo City in which the protection of the United States was requested and the question raised whether the United States "would allow this Republic to annex themselves."<sup>310</sup>

The English answer to this request for aid, through its representative, Sir Robert Schomburgk, was a refusal based on the ground that "British interests and commerce were not sufficiently involved to justify the expense."<sup>311</sup> April 19, 1849, in a secret session, the Dominican Congress authorized the president to place the republic under the protection of France, who was to receive in return the cession of Samana Bay.<sup>312</sup> This offer was forwarded at once to France but again Great Britain stepped in and the

<sup>308</sup> 41 Cong., 3 sess., Sen. Doc. 17, 42.

<sup>309</sup> Porter, *Secret Missions to San Domingo*.

<sup>310</sup> State Department Archives, Elliott to the Secretary of State, May 2, 1849.

<sup>311</sup> 33 Cong., 1 sess., Sen. Doc. 12, 4.

<sup>312</sup> Britannicus, *The Dominican Republic and the Emperor Soulouque*, 43. 33 Cong., 1 sess. Sen. Doc. 12, 3.

"intimations" of the British minister at Paris were sufficient to cause France to withdraw from the undertaking.<sup>313</sup>

Before the French answer was received, our third special agent had arrived in the island, Benjamin E. Green, a son of General Duff Green and at one time secretary of the American legation in Mexico. His avowed purpose was to investigate conditions in Santo Domingo with a view of ascertaining the stability of the government. It was commonly reported, however, though denied by Mr. Green, that his mission was to prevent the establishment of a French protectorate over the Dominican Republic. If that was not his mission, he at least did everything in his power to prevent the consummation of such an arrangement between France and the Dominican Republic, warning the latter government that such a protectorate would not be "pleasing to the United States."<sup>314</sup>

He had the power to conclude a treaty of friendship and commerce if he found conditions satisfactory;<sup>315</sup> the necessary conditions being the competency of the people "to discharge the duties of an independent state," and "the ascendancy of the Spanish race in the government, and as fair a numerical proportion of that race to the others as in the other Spanish American States."<sup>316</sup> The question of the French protectorate and later the request for joint action by France, England and the United States in Dominican affairs, made it seem inadvisable to conclude a treaty at that time.

As soon as the definite refusal of France to interfere in Dominican affairs was made known, application was made to Mr. Green, as representative of the United States, for the intervention of that nation with Haiti.<sup>317</sup> As Mr. Green could not, without communicating with Washington, give any answer at all to the request, and as he could give no as-

<sup>313</sup> 33 Cong., 1 sess., Sen. Doc. 12, 9.

<sup>314</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>315</sup> *Ibid.*, 3. State Department Archives, Elliott to the Secretary of State, July 13, 1850.

<sup>316</sup> 33 Cong., 1 sess., Sen. Doc. 12, 10-11.

<sup>317</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

surance of a favorable reply, the president, feeling the need of immediate assistance, determined upon a joint invitation to England, France and the United States to undertake mediation with Haiti.<sup>318</sup> This resolution was put into effect during Mr. Green's stay in the island and received his approval. Favorable action upon the proposal by the three nations concerned, resulted in the tripartite intervention of 1851.

Aside from the diplomatic mission entrusted to Mr. Green by the State Department, he was interested, with his father, in the promotion of a colonization scheme, which had in view the securing of vast concessions of land in Santo Domingo and the wholesale importation of Americans into the island. The purpose of the scheme apparently was to Americanize the island by encouraging immigration from the United States with a view to the subsequent annexation of the island. Mr. Green's offer to the Dominican government included "a considerable loan of money, one or two steamers, and the advantages of a regular postal communication with the United States, in consideration of which the Greens and their associates were to be allowed to introduce American colonists, who shall carry on mining, the cutting of dyewoods and other precious trees, and agriculture, and enjoy certain peculiar privileges, among the rest that of a *separate military organization with their own officers*. These propositions the Dominicans did not see fit to accept, being afraid of a repetition among themselves of the the Texas drama, with the introduction of slavery."<sup>319</sup>

The scheme seems to have been one step in the attempt to realize the Southern dream of a slave state built up around the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, under the protection of the United States and restoring to the slavocracy the balance of power of which expansion to the west and northwest had deprived it. The ultimate object of the scheme was too apparent to permit of its acceptance

<sup>318</sup> 33 Cong., 1 sess., Sen. Doc. 12, 16.

<sup>319</sup> *New York Daily Tribune*, September 5, 1854.

by the Dominican Republic and it was dropped, to be revived later by General Cazneau.<sup>320</sup>

In Haiti, to which Mr. Green went from the Dominican Republic, his action aroused much greater discontent. At his first meeting with the special commissioners appointed to treat with him, he presented claims of American citizens amounting to half a million dollars. The Haitian government professed never to have heard of the claims and asked for a delay for investigation. This Mr. Green granted but only on condition that Haiti should recognize the United States commercial agency.<sup>321</sup> He further notified the government that the United States "would not remain disinterested spectators of this unwarrantable contest" with the Dominican Republic.<sup>322</sup> There is little wonder that the United States was unpopular among the Haitians, when it added to an open espousal of the Dominican cause, which took from Haiti two-thirds of the island, such blustering menaces to the dignity of Haiti itself.

Close upon Mr. Green's mission came the tripartite intervention, an interlude savoring of the opera bouffé. Washington's advice to avoid entangling alliances seems to have been forgotten in this rather unusual joint action taken by the United States in conjunction with Great Britain and France in settling the relations of two Latin American states. Not only did the American government coöperate with France and Great Britain but the two European nations were permitted to take the initiative, while the United States merely followed their lead.

On January 24, 1850, a note was addressed by Delmonte, Dominican secretary of state, to Mr. Green asking for American intervention.<sup>323</sup> No action was taken by Mr. Green except to forward the request to the government at Washington. But the Dominican government was not

<sup>320</sup> Handelmann, *Geschichte der Insel Hayti*, 185. Clark, *Remarks upon United States Intervention in Hayti*, 32. *Feuille de Commerce*, October 14, 1854. *Le Courrier des États-Unis*, December 18, 1852.

<sup>321</sup> State Department Archives, Usher to Clayton, May 13, 1850.

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*, June 28, 1850.

<sup>323</sup> 33 Cong., 1 sess., Sen Doc. 12, 16.

satisfied. On February 18, President Baez in a long interview, informed Mr. Green that

he had been, and is now, much pressed to call in the mediation of England, which he is unwilling to do, unless it should be conjointly with the United States and France; that the action of the United States on the application for intervention, if favorable, might be too dilatory to prevent the anticipated invasion; that as I could give no assurance as to what that action would be, he felt it to be his duty to omit no step which might tend to peace and the benefit of his country, and was therefore inclined to invite the mediation of England, jointly with France and the United States, if such a step would be acceptable.<sup>324</sup>

On the next day at a second interview, Mr. Green reminded the president of the opposition of the United States to European interference in American affairs, but refused to take the responsibility of advising him not to ask for joint mediation.<sup>325</sup> The result was the joint note of February 22, 1850, addressed by the Dominican secretary of state to the representatives of England, France and the United States in Santo Domingo City, in which the mediation of the three nations with Haiti was requested.<sup>326</sup>

A consideration of the request was transferred to Washington, where conferences took place between Mr. Clayton, the American secretary of state, and the British and French ministers.<sup>327</sup> On sounding the secretary of state, the British minister, Sir H. L. Bulwer, was informed that "the United States had no intention to take the Dominicans under their protection" and that Mr. Clayton would "be very happy if the United States, Great Britain and France could be brought to act unitedly together, for the purpose of procuring a permanent cessation of hostilities between the two races."<sup>328</sup> In May, 1850, Sir Henry Bulwer informed the secretary of state that "the French Government had expressed its willingness to coöperate with the governments of Great Britain and the United States for

<sup>324</sup> 33 Cong., 1 sess., Sen. Doc. 12, 17.

<sup>325</sup> *Ibid.*, 17-18.

<sup>326</sup> *Ibid.*, 19-21.

<sup>327</sup> Moore, *Digest of International Law*, vi, 509.

<sup>328</sup> State Department Archives, H. L. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston, enclosed in a letter of Usher to Clayton, June 28, 1850.

the purpose indicated.”<sup>329</sup> It was not until the beginning of 1851 that arrangements for joint action were completed.

Just what the underlying motives were which determined the three nations to accept the Dominican invitation, is difficult to determine. At the foundation seems to have been the feeling that intervention of some sort was necessary and since intervention by one nation was not to be considered, joint action by the three nations most interested was unavoidable. The American government seems to have been in earnest in its desire to bring about peace in Santo Domingo in order to restore prosperity to the island and to lessen the danger of European intervention. That England and France were as desirous as the United States of an amicable settlement of the relations between the two parts of the island was considered false by the American agent. Both nations had more to gain by a continuance of disorder within the island which made both Haiti and the Dominican Republic dependent on foreign assistance, while neither could afford to have the United States take any steps which would lead to a good understanding between the two states and to an increase in American influence thereby.

The course of action of the American government did not meet with unqualified approval at home and there was a feeling prevalent in certain sections of the United States that “in uniting with France and England in an offensive interference with the affairs of Hayti, an independent and friendly state. . . . the government of the United States were pulling nuts out of the fire, solely for the benefit of the other interventionists.”<sup>330</sup>

It had been Mr. Clayton’s intention to appoint a *chargé d’affaires* to Santo Domingo but President Taylor’s death put the matter into the hands of the new secretary of state, Mr. Webster. He decided that it would be wiser to confide the business to a special agent.<sup>331</sup> The choice fell upon

<sup>329</sup> Moore, *Digest of International Law*, vi, 509.

<sup>330</sup> Clark, *Remarks on United States Intervention in Hayti*, 21.

<sup>331</sup> 32 Cong., 1 Sess., Sen Doc. 112, 3.

Robert M. Walsh and its wisdom, if placating the Haitian government was Mr. Walsh's mission, may be doubted.

Mr. Walsh was advised by the secretary of state to put aside all "prejudices resulting from color or forms of government,"<sup>332</sup> but his attempt to follow instructions was rather unsuccessful. His attitude toward the government to which he was accredited may be illustrated by his reply to a charge, made by the Haitian minister of foreign affairs, of the existence of prejudices in the United States against men of the African race. He replied in part:

If the prejudices to which the Haitian government has so improperly alluded, do still exist, it is attributable in no small degree to that government itself. When it devotes its energies to the successful cultivation of the arts of peace, instead of desolating one of the fairest portions of the earth, with ruthless and insensate strife; when it exhibits a spectacle of national prosperity and enlightenment which shall command the respect of the civilized world, when it does this it will materially assist in dislodging those "prejudices" by proving that they are radically unjust. Until then it can not be entitled to denounce in any way the "state of things" of which it has ventured officially to deplore the existence in "a country so civilized as the United States."<sup>333</sup>

Mr. Walsh's despatches read oddly amid grave diplomatic correspondence as he describes in ironical terms the glory of the court of Emperor Faustin I and his black dukes and duchesses. Such an attitude was not likely to prove conciliatory to the Haitian government.

Mr. Walsh was instructed to coöperate with the British and French consuls but his power was limited to diplomatic pressure and did not extend to a menace of force.<sup>334</sup> The French and British representatives were given ampler powers. They were instructed, acting in the closest harmony, to demand an immediate cessation of hostilities, to be followed by either a peace or at least a ten year's truce and they were authorized to support their demand by a show of force extending to a threat of blockade of the

<sup>332</sup> 32 Cong., 1 Sess., Sen. Doc. 112, 3.

<sup>333</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>334</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.



Haitian ports.<sup>335</sup> Beyond that, however, they were not permitted to go without authorization from their respective governments.

The American agent reached Port au Prince February 2, 1851. He found that hostilities had already ceased and that a note had been sent December 19, 1850; by the British and French representatives, insisting on a truce for ten years and threatening coercive measures if any new expedition were sent against Dominican territory.<sup>336</sup> No answer had been received, so on the eleventh of February the three representatives united in a note demanding "a categorical answer to the following proposition: *A definitive treaty of peace, or a truce of ten years, between the empire of Hayti and the Dominican republic.*"<sup>337</sup> The categorical answer not being forthcoming, they called on the Minister of Foreign Affairs a week later, but he put them off by stating that such action as they desired involved a breach of the constitution about which the senate must be consulted.<sup>338</sup> To confirm their suspicions that this was mere evasion, they learned that the emperor's private secretary, becoming communicative under the influence of champagne, had stated candidly that "his master would let the plenipotentiaries, as he styled them, amuse themselves for awhile with speeches and notes, but would eventually get rid of them, without committing himself in the least."<sup>339</sup>

The next step was the appointment of four commissioners by the Haitian government to treat with the foreign agents, but as they were given no power beyond that of discussion, their appointment resulted merely in the consuming of three more weeks without any effect upon the negotiations. Walsh tried to aid the settlement by alternately promising to establish consular relations with the Haitians if they yielded and threatening them with a filibustering expedition if they did not.<sup>340</sup>

<sup>335</sup> 32 Cong., 1 sess., Sen. Doc. 112, 5-7.

<sup>336</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>337</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>338</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>340</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.



At last the four months which the American agent was allowed for his mission came to an end and he was obliged to leave with nothing more definite than a promise from the emperor to abstain from hostilities for the time being. With this the British and French consuls professed themselves content. That Faustin should have been able to play in such fashion with the "three chief powers of the globe," Walsh attributed to the fact that Great Britain and France did not act in harmony with their threats and he was convinced that the emperor was assured that France at least would never resort to force.<sup>341</sup>

With the failure of the tripartite intervention, American relations with Haiti became of subordinate importance until the formal recognition of the Haitian Republic in 1862 and the accrediting to it of a regular diplomatic agent. In the period between, the American support of the Dominican Republic and the attempt to annex it to the United States increased the feeling of hostility against the American nation which had been growing steadily since the days of the Panama Congress.

## CHAPTER VIII

### A DECADE OF AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

With the fifties a new phase of American-Dominican relations was entered upon, which was not ended until twenty years later. During all that time the American government coquetted with the idea of the annexation of the Dominican Republic or at least of the purchase of Samana Bay. Again and again arrangements were almost completed for the transfer of Dominican territory to the United States but they as often fell through.

The annexation movement had two phases, only the first of which is to be discussed. In the second period from 1865, the end of the Spanish protectorate, to 1873, the annexation movement was the work of two men, first of

<sup>341</sup> Walsh, *My Mission to Saint Domingo*, 307.

Seward, who, as secretary of state, showed himself an ardent imperialist, and second of Grant, to whom the annexation of Santo Domingo became a pet project toward the fulfilment of which he stubbornly bent all his energies. But in the face of the indifference of the American public, both men were destined to fail.

In the first period, which extended to the Civil War, the motive force in the movement toward annexation was the same as that which inspired the war against Mexico and the filibustering expeditions against Cuba, the desire of Southern statesmen for expansion southward. Out of the territory which they would thereby gain, they hoped to reestablish their ascendancy in the national government which was fast disappearing before the influx of northern and western free states. Projects for the formation of four slave-holding states from the territory of Cuba, Porto Rico and Santo Domingo were freely discussed.<sup>342</sup>

The reason for the failure of such schemes in regard to Santo Domingo was partly northern opposition at home but more particularly the fear of complications with European nations. "Out of six administrations, five one after another, refused to accept Samana at the hazard of exciting French or British opposition."<sup>343</sup> Of Webster it was said; "he would not hear of a naval station either at Samana or Manzanillo, even in free gift, because such an advanced position in the midst of the West India colonies, might give offence to the great European powers."<sup>344</sup>

The tripartite intervention had failed in its attempt to secure the safety of the Dominican Republic against Haitian attacks. Negotiations had therefore to be continued with the various nations especially interested in the Dominican Republic in an attempt to secure the needed assistance against Haiti. In 1852 Kossuth, then making his triumphal progress through the United States, was asked, apparently by an American colonization company, to aid

<sup>342</sup> *New York Tribune*, October 20, 1854.

<sup>343</sup> Cazneau, *To the American Press. The Dominican Negotiations*, 2.

<sup>344</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

in its scheme of colonizing the Dominican Republic and protecting it against Haitian invasions.<sup>345</sup>

It was in that same year that Everett, secretary of state and representative of northern feeling, outlined the policy of nonintervention which he thought the United States ought to pursue in Santo Domingo. Writing to the American minister to France in regard to the tripartite intervention, he said:

The policy pursued by the United States in this respect has been wholly disinterested. It has been, no doubt, in our power to obtain a permanent foothold in Dominica; and we have as much need of a naval station at Samana as any European power could possibly have. It has, however, been the steady rule of our policy to avoid, as far as possible, all disturbances of the existing political relations of the West Indies. We have felt that any attempts on the part of any one of the great maritime powers to obtain exclusive advantages in any of the islands, where such an attempt was likely to be made, would be apt to be followed by others, and end in converting the archipelago into a great theater of national competition for exclusive advantages and territorial acquisitions, which might become fatal to the peace of the world.<sup>346</sup>

Early in 1853 there was a rumor, which proved false, that France had occupied Samana Bay.<sup>347</sup> It grew out of a determined effort by the French consul-general in Santo Domingo, Maxime Raybaud, to make French influence dominant in the eastern half of the island.<sup>348</sup> A little later the United States raised the question of securing a foothold in Samana Bay, but the time did not seem favorable.<sup>349</sup> The banishment of Baez, who had been president since 1849 and was considered to favor French rather than American intervention, and the succession to the presidential chair of Santana, was looked upon as favorable to American interests and as offering an opportunity of securing commercial advantages and perhaps the purchase of Samana Bay.

<sup>345</sup> *Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings*, lxiv, 212-213.

<sup>346</sup> Moore, *Digest of International Law*, vi, 514.

<sup>347</sup> *Ibid.*, 515.

<sup>348</sup> D'Alaux, *op. cit.* 283.

<sup>349</sup> State Department Archives, Elliott to Marcy, March 22, 1853.

Accordingly an agent was despatched to the island to make a careful examination of the situation, "to relax the fetters on American trade and ascertain to what extent the young Dominican Republic was prepared to take a position in our continental circle of policy as a really independent American state."<sup>350</sup> The agent selected was General William L. Cazneau, a Texan of French descent, a Catholic and a Southern sympathizer.<sup>351</sup> Investing heavily in Dominican lands and realizing the wealth that he would reap from American control of the island, he became a moving spirit in all the projects leading toward annexation, and, especially in the negotiations conducted during Grant's presidency, he acquired an unenviable reputation as an unscrupulous promoter.

Having found conditions favorable to American interests and Santana willing to grant any concessions desired provided the United States assured him protection against England, France, Spain and Haiti, Cazneau returned to the United States in order to make his report in person and to urge upon the president and his cabinet the advisability of taking advantage of the favorable chance to secure Samana Bay as a naval base.

The first result of his return was seen in a resolution introduced into the senate on May 23, 1854, by Stephen A. Douglas; "that the Committee on Foreign Relations be instructed to inquire into the expediency of recognizing the independence of the republic of Dominica, and of opening diplomatic intercourse with the same."<sup>352</sup> Recognition of Dominican independence foreboded, to the anti-slavery leaders, the establishment of Southern influence in Santo Domingo and the gradual wresting of the island from negro control. To such men it was essential that the Haitians be given a fair chance to prove their capacity for self-government. They therefore opposed any movement looking toward the extension of American control in Santo Domingo.

<sup>350</sup> Cazneau, *op. cit.* 2.

<sup>351</sup> Handelmann, *op. cit.* 185.

<sup>352</sup> 33 Cong., 1 sess., Cong. Globe, 1280.

The resolution introduced by Douglas aroused Charles Sumner to the defence of Haiti. On June 17, he wrote to John Bigelow in regard to the resolution: "For a fortnight I have not been out of my seat for a moment during the morning hour, fearing that the resolution might be sprung upon us. Should it come up I propose to move an amendment by adding 'and Haiti.'" <sup>353</sup> The resolution did not, however, come up to a vote and the danger from it soon passed. The reason for its failure is given by Hunt as the publication by John Bigelow in the *New York Evening Post* of a list of the leading officials of the Dominican Republic with their pedigree, showing that they were all men of color. "As the recognition of colored people formed no part of President Pierce's policy, the subject was dropped by his cabinet." <sup>354</sup> During the rest of the year the Northern press under the leadership of Bigelow and of Greeley of the *New York Tribune* kept up a steady fight against the Southern schemes for the annexation of Santo Domingo.

Cazneau had not found the secretary of state enthusiastic in regard to his plans for the purchase of Samana Bay, but Guthrie of the Treasury, <sup>355</sup> and probably Jefferson Davis of the War Department supported him warmly. <sup>356</sup> It was decided by the cabinet to send Cazneau back to Santo Domingo to negotiate for the purchase of Samana Bay and to send with him Captain George B. McClellan to make an investigation of the bay and select the best site on it for a naval station. They reached Santo Domingo City on July 17 and, much against Cazneau's will, McClellan insisted on proceeding at once to his task. <sup>357</sup> The negotiations started badly. McClellan's premature demonstration on Samana Bay gave the anti-American party an opportunity to raise the cry "that the United States intended to take the country, and that General Santana

<sup>353</sup> Bigelow, *Retrospections of an Active Life*, i, 160.

<sup>354</sup> Hunt, in a manuscript catalog of books dealing with Haiti, preserved in the Boston Public Library.

<sup>355</sup> Cazneau, *op. cit.* 4.

<sup>356</sup> Porter, *op. cit.* 626.

<sup>357</sup> State Department Archives, Cazneau to Marcy, July 24, 1854.

was conspiring to betray the colored population into slavery.<sup>358</sup> The charge was more readily believed by the mass of Dominicans because they already held the opinion that "their domains will be seized, the native whites set aside, and the blacks enslaved if the Americans gain a foothold on their Island."<sup>359</sup>

Steps were immediately taken by the British and French representatives to prevent a friendly understanding between the United States and the Dominican Republic. Three weeks after McClellan's reconnaissance, the British consul, Sir Robert Shomburgk "made an official call on the President and Cabinet and in the name of his government protested against any stipulations or agreement which would give to the United States a coal depot."<sup>360</sup> Dropping the idea of securing a coaling station, therefore, for the time being, General Cazneau entered upon the business of negotiating a treaty of friendship, commerce and extradition.

By the end of September the treaty was nearing completion.<sup>361</sup> Learning of the success of the American agent, an interview was forced by the British and French consuls with the Dominican cabinet, "in which this government was informed the Emperor Faustin would not consent to a peace if the treaty of peace with the United States was carried into effect and that France and England would also withdraw their protection and leave the Dominican territory and people at the mercy of Hayti," a virtual threat of forcible reannexation to Haiti.<sup>362</sup> In spite of these menaces, the Santo Domingan plenipotentiaries, relying on the protection of the United States, signed the treaty on the fifth of October. The treaty thus drawn up, was in the ordinary form but it excited the liveliest apprehensions among the European representatives because they saw it as a first step toward American dominance in the Domini-

<sup>358</sup> State Department Archives, Cazneau to Marcy, August 8, 1854.

<sup>359</sup> *Ibid.*, July 24, 1854.

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*, August 19, 1854.

<sup>361</sup> *Ibid.*, September 23, 1854.

<sup>362</sup> *Ibid.*, November 23, 1854.

can Republic, which would lead to their exclusion from all commercial and trade privileges. They therefore took every step possible to prevent the ratification of the treaty.

The French consul-general at Port au Prince was hurried over to Santo Domingo City to assist the anti-American party. On October 28, the day following his arrival, the British consul

notified the Dominican Government that he was instructed by Lord Clarendon to inform it of the disapprobation with which Her Majesty's government learned that "*notwithstanding the advice*" offered by France and England President Santana had thought proper "*to negociate a treaty with the United States by which the safety and welfare of the Republic would be greatly and immediately endangered*" and he adds—always in the name of Lord Clarendon: Such arrangements should not have been made without their knowledge and sanction "*particularly with a power which has hitherto refused to acknowledge the independence of the Dominican Republic, and the suddenness and peremptory character of whose proceedings must cause well-founded suspicions of its ulterior object.*"<sup>363</sup>

Early in November French war vessels began to arrive in the harbor of Santo Domingo City and any hope of securing a treaty of any kind was gone. Cazneau, therefore, resolved to withdraw the treaty from the consideration of the Dominican Congress but to show their power, the British and French consuls forced the Congress to pass what Cazneau called a caricature of the treaty with "offensive mutilations and additions."<sup>364</sup> His objection was probably to the amendment desired by the Dominican Congress to the third article of the treaty which granted the reciprocal rights of citizens to the nationals of each state in the territory of the other. To make the statement more explicit the Dominicans wished to add:

It is however expressly agreed that neither the present article, nor the following, shall be construed to allow any exclusion or exception whatever, which may be applied to mulatto citizens in any part of the territory of the two contracting powers; and that, in one word, in all the States of the American Union, the rights

<sup>363</sup> State Department Archives, Cazneau to Marcy, November 23, 1854.

<sup>364</sup> *Ibid.*, December 6, 1854.



and treatment of the Dominicans generally shall be the same, *without regard to descent or color*.<sup>365</sup>

Such an article, the secretary of state said later was "not to be entertained, it being contrary to the feeling of a large proportion of our citizens. . . . The Safety and peace of the Southern States" demanded the exclusion of Dominican citizens from their territory.<sup>366</sup>

France and England "under the title of the 'mediating powers' " continued to exercise "a dictatorial supervision altogether incompatible with the independence of the Dominican Republic."<sup>367</sup> In December, to complete the work begun, an ultimatum was sent to the Dominican government by the French and British consuls which forbade any alienation of territory or surrender of national jurisdiction without the consent of both France and England and which effectually blocked any further attempt of the United States to secure special advantages in the island.<sup>368</sup> General Cazneau remained as agent until June, 1855, but was unable to secure any concessions, opposed as he was by England and France, "whose avowed and leading object" was "to check the advance of American principles and restrict the scope of American enterprise in the Antilles."<sup>369</sup>

But the American government was not willing to abandon the attempt to secure a treaty with the Dominican Republic. In October, 1855, Jonathan Elliott, commercial agent at Santo Domingo City, was instructed to press for the ratification of the treaty which Cazneau had negotiated but with the omission of the amendment proposed by the Dominican government, "to place Dominicans, in the United States, of all complexions on the same footing as citizens of the United States."<sup>370</sup> The particular reason for

<sup>365</sup> *New York Daily Tribune*, December 27, 1854.

<sup>366</sup> State Department Archives, Instructions to Jonathan Elliott, October 9, 1855.

<sup>367</sup> State Department Archives, Cazneau to Marcy, December 23, 1854.

<sup>368</sup> *Ibid.*, December 26, 1854.

<sup>369</sup> *Ibid.*, June 9, 1855.

<sup>370</sup> State Department Archives, Instructions to Jonathan Elliott, October 9, 1855.



entering into negotiation was, as before, to secure a naval station in Samana Bay.

The treaty was begun in December but was interrupted by a Haitian invasion.<sup>371</sup> No convention in regard to Samana was possible at that time but with that exception the treaty desired by the United States was concluded. It was signed in March, 1856, ratified by the Dominican government and despatched to Washington.<sup>372</sup> Spanish opposition had in the meantime been added to French and British. The Black Warrior affair and the Ostend Manifesto had awakened Spanish fear for the safety of Cuba and she was far from desiring to see the United States established in Santo Domingo from which a descent upon the Cuban coast would be very easy. The Spanish *chargé d'affaires* and consul-general, Segovia, who reached Santo Domingo in December, 1855, announced that "a war between the United States and Spain is indispensable this year, and it will better suit Spain, to meet the Americans here as the field of battle, instead of Cuba."<sup>373</sup>

Segovia immediately began to work against the treaty. After it was signed, he offered, if the Dominican government would refuse to ratify it, "a Spanish protectorate—a quantity of troops and a good navy," and, in addition, to assume "all the consequences that might occur in making opposition to the United States."<sup>374</sup> Despite his threats and promises the treaty was ratified.

But the foreign representatives were not discouraged. On the eighteenth of July the consuls of Spain, England and France met in secret conference with the Dominican cabinet to force them by threats to withdraw the American treaty.<sup>375</sup> At the same time they bent their energies toward removing from the presidency Santana to whom they were hostile because of his friendliness to the United

<sup>371</sup> State Department Archives, Elliott to Marcy, January 16, 1856.

<sup>372</sup> *Ibid.*, March 22, 1856.

<sup>373</sup> State Department Archives, Pereira to the Secretary of State, August 7, 1856.

<sup>374</sup> State Department Archives, Elliott to Marcy, July 19, 1856.

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid.*, September 10, 1856.

States, and replacing him by Baez, whom the American officials considered desirous of a French protectorate. The Spanish consul was particularly active because of the unfriendly relations still existing between his government and the United States. The efforts of the European representatives met with success so far as the change of administration was concerned and Baez became again president of the Dominican Republic.

Even after the downfall of Santana, the Dominican government was still willing to treat with the United States and to make any concessions desired, but demanded as a *sine qua non* of entering into any negotiation, that the American agent be given full powers to treat and in addition be supplied with a sufficient number of war vessels to guard the government against the consequences of making concessions in the face of European opposition.<sup>376</sup> But the American government was quite as unwilling as the Dominican to incur the hostility of the great European powers and so allowed itself to be blustered out of its plans by threats of force.

The difficulties in the way of a realization of the Southern dream, would have been many. European opposition was to be reckoned on. In addition there was sure to be opposition at home, while any attempt to reestablish slavery in Santo Domingo would have met with a wide-spread revolt from its emancipated population.

In April, 1859, General Cazneau was again appointed commissioner to the Dominican Republic but on this second mission he was instructed merely to report on conditions and to secure satisfaction for certain American claims. Any further purpose would have been futile, for the Spanish movement was already on foot and American influence in the island was practically nil.

<sup>376</sup> State Department Archives, Pereira to the Secretary of State, August 7, 1856; Elliott to Marcy, September 10, 1856.

## CHAPTER IX

THE SPANISH PROTECTORATE AND THE RECOGNITION OF  
SANTO DOMINGAN INDEPENDENCE

In spite of all the attempts made by France, England and the United States to control the destinies of Santo Domingo, the only foreign power which in the nineteenth century succeeded in establishing its authority in the island was Spain. The Spanish protectorate over the Dominican Republic, which lasted from 1861 to 1865, forms an interesting episode in Spanish colonial history. Spain was actuated in part by a sentimental desire to regain control of the ancient cradle of her colonial empire and in part by the need of protecting Cuba and Porto Rico by preventing the United States from securing on Samana Bay a base of attack against those islands. The impression was prevalent in Spain that "the United States were constantly lying in wait to pounce upon the Spanish American colonies, and that the only way to keep Dominica out of our hands, and prevent its becoming an outpost of the United States, threatening Cuba on the one side and Porto Rico on the other, was to hold on to the coveted island, and fortify, garrison, and defend it to the last extremity as the key-stone in the arch of Spanish colonial power in America."<sup>377</sup>

Among the Dominicans the movement toward reannexation to Spain was not popular. It owed its success to the fact that it was pushed through by a "very small but powerful faction of Dominicans, headed by the late President, General Santana."<sup>378</sup> As early as 1858, immediately after the overthrow of Baez and the establishment in his place of Santana, the latter made a special attempt to secure Spanish aid against an expected attack from Haiti.<sup>379</sup> Negotiations looking toward annexation continued. Early in 1860, the Spanish ministry notified the Dominican gov-

<sup>377</sup> *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1865, pt. II, 535. Perry to Seward, May 7, 1865.

<sup>378</sup> Chesson, *The Annexation of San Domingo to Spain*, 3.

<sup>379</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1906, pt. I, 575.

ernment that it was "disposed to accede to the plan of a protectorate for the Dominican Republic."<sup>380</sup> In July, commissioners arrived from Spain to further plans for annexation,<sup>381</sup> and in that same month General Cazneau noted that fifteen hundred Spanish subjects had already been permanently settled on Dominican territory and three more vessels loaded with Spaniards were due to arrive soon.<sup>382</sup>

The times were favorable for such a movement, for the United States, the only nation desirous of preventing Spanish control of her former colony, was too much engrossed by the approaching struggle over slavery to make even a protest against the Spanish attempt.<sup>383</sup> That Spain realized the situation only too clearly is shown by her assurances to the Dominican cabinet that "the United States will soon be forced to abandon the Monroe Doctrine" and her boast that she was "seeking an opportunity to repress American pretensions in the sea of the Antilles."<sup>384</sup>

In the spring of 1861 the reincorporation of the Dominican Republic with Spain was formally completed. The final steps evoked no popular enthusiasm. Neither was there much popular opposition. Spain had of course taken pains to prevent opposition by a judicious use of war ships and troops from Cuba.<sup>385</sup> But even more than that, the desire for peace and tranquillity and protection from Haitian aggression was so great and the probability of securing a settled condition of affairs, save under foreign domination, was so slight, that the Santo Domingans were willing to acquiesce in President Santana's action in the hope that it might really result to the advantage of the country.

The United States, with Seward in the department of

<sup>380</sup> State Department Archives, Cazneau to Cass, March 2, 1860.

<sup>381</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1906, pt. I, 575.

<sup>382</sup> State Department Archives, Cazneau to Cass, July 31, 1860.

<sup>383</sup> Cazneau, *op. cit.* 8.

<sup>384</sup> State Department Archives, Cazneau to Cass, November 17, 1861.

<sup>385</sup> Chesson, *op. cit.* 3, 5. Papers relating to the Annexation of Eastern Santo Domingo to Spain, *passim*.

state, took prompt action. On April 1, 1861, he submitted his famous *Thoughts* for the president's consideration. On the next day he proceeded to put his plan into force and pave the way for war with Spain. Writing to Tassara, the Spanish minister at Washington, in regard to the "reported subversion of the Dominican Republic by the Spanish authorities in Cuba, with a view to establish a Spanish protectorate or annexing the territory to Spain," he said that, if such proceedings should have been taken under the authority of the Spanish government, the president would "be obliged to regard them as manifesting an unfriendly spirit towards the United States, and to meet the further prosecution of enterprises of that kind in regard to either the Dominican Republic or any part of the American Continent or islands with a prompt, persistent, and, if possible, effective resistance."<sup>386</sup> Such a note might well have led to war if Spain had so desired. But Tassara returned an evasive answer and by July, when he announced the annexation of the Dominican Republic, Seward had learned from his chief that domestic concerns were sufficient to keep the administration busy and that any interference, for the time being, in foreign affairs was to be zealously avoided.

In the meantime, however, Seward had taken further action. On April 27, he wrote to Schurz, the newly appointed minister to Madrid, authorizing him to say to the Spanish government that "the President will regard any attempt of Her Catholic Majesty's Government to retain the territory of the late Dominican Republic as a matter claiming very serious attention on the part of the Government of the United States."<sup>387</sup> He added that American forbearance from interfering with Spanish control of Cuba and Porto Rico was based on the belief "that Spain is not an aggressive power, and that she is content to leave the Spanish-American independent States free from her intervention, and at liberty to regulate their own affairs and

<sup>386</sup> Moore, *Digest of International Law*, vi., 515.

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.*, vi, 515.

work their own destiny;" thus adding to a protest against Spanish control of Santo Domingo a menace to all the Spanish possessions in the West Indies.<sup>388</sup>

On May 21, Perry, the American chargé d'affaires at Madrid, was instructed "to protest against the assumption or exercise of Spanish authority" in Santo Domingo, "a protest which, in every case, we shall expect to maintain."<sup>389</sup> But two weeks later, Seward was careful to warn the American minister to confine his action merely to a protest,<sup>390</sup> and on the twenty-second of June he expressed his belief that it was inexpedient to divert the attention of Congress "from the domestic subjects" which it was convened to consider. Mr. Schurz was accordingly instructed to protest only in case Mr. Perry had not already done so, and, if he took such action, to make his protest "in such a manner as to indicate our firm denial of the rightfulness of the annexation."<sup>391</sup> As Spain had no reason for desiring to provoke a war with the United States and as the American government was temporarily without the power to make good its threats, the whole question was allowed to drop with the lodging of the protest at Madrid.

One good effect was produced by the American protest. Haiti was especially fearful of the Spanish reëntry into the island of Santo Domingo, dreading the reintroduction by her of slavery. "Spanish possession and colonization of the eastern half of the island, means slavery in the island of Haiti; it means slavery within seven leagues of the capital of the republic."<sup>392</sup> That the United States was willing to oppose such a movement, thereby allying herself with Haitian interests, awakened a livelier feeling of good will than the Black Republic had been accustomed to feel, though the hopes built upon the prospect of American intervention were not realized.<sup>393</sup>

<sup>388</sup> Moore, *Digest of International Law*, vi, 516.

<sup>389</sup> *Ibid.*, vi, 516.

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid.*, vi, 516.

<sup>391</sup> *Ibid.*, vi, 516.

<sup>392</sup> Editorial, *L'Opinion Nationale*, April 16, 1861.

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid.*, June 29, 1861.

Two years were sufficient to convince the Santo Dominicans that Spain had learned nothing in her three hundred and fifty years of colonial experience. Greed and oppression characterized the Spanish rule as it had always characterized it. "If ever the true history be written of that temporary resuscitation of a colony, the Spaniards themselves will be astonished at the revelations of iniquity and fraud that brought about the revolution against them."<sup>394</sup> It was too high a price to pay for peace. In 1863 an anti-Spanish movement began which by the summer of 1865 was crowned with success.

In 1863, however, affairs in the United States were in too critical a condition to warrant the slightest provocation to Spain by granting aid or recognition to the insurgent party. The position taken by the United States during that and the following year, was explained by Seward to the American minister at Madrid, in March, 1864.

The revolutionists in the island [Santo Domingo] have, in various forms and through several channels, appealed to this government for recognition, for aid, and for sympathy. Pursuing the policy we have too ineffectually insisted upon at the hands of other nations, we have not received any agents of the revolution, even informally, nor have we in any way responded to them, while we have given instructions to the ministerial officers to see that the neutrality laws of the United States are regularly maintained and enforced.<sup>395</sup>

By that time Spain had begun to realize that the conquest of Santo Domingo was impossible and the annexation was a "most egregious blunder."<sup>396</sup> In May, 1864, Seward prophesied that "every attempt to restore European dominion in America" would end in disappointment, though the disappointment might "be delayed until the successful close of our own troubles shall allow the prestige of the United States to be restored."<sup>397</sup> But no diplomatic pressure

<sup>394</sup> St. John, *op. cit.* 106.

<sup>395</sup> *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1864, pt. 4, 12. Seward to Koerner, March 12, 1864.

<sup>396</sup> *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1864, pt. 4, 8. Koerner to Seward, February 14, 1864.

<sup>397</sup> *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1864, pt. 4, 19. Seward to Koerner, May 4, 1864.



was brought to bear on Spain until she had already taken steps leading to her withdrawal from Santo Domingo. In January, 1865, a bill repealing the act annexing the Dominican Republic was introduced into the Cortes. On April 1, it passed the Chamber of Deputies and twenty days later the Senate. On April 30 it received the queen's signature and on May 5 a royal decree was issued announcing the abandonment by Spain of Santo Domingo.<sup>398</sup> By July the evacuation was completed and the Dominican Republic was once again free.

Seward had done everything possible to encourage the passage of the bill. In January, 1865, Perry reported that "the name of the United States had been used as a bug-bear by the leaders of the opposition" to compel the retention of the island.<sup>399</sup> Seward, who was so soon to cast longing eyes upon Santo Domingo itself, assured the Spanish that "there is one national passion which the United States have not developed and are not likely to develop as strongly as other states, namely, the passion of conquest."<sup>400</sup> In April the secretary of state was in position to write in more vigorous terms and he did so. "It has been my earnest desire that Spain might anticipate the other maritime powers in retiring from the erring policy of 1861." Such a proceeding "would probably open harmonious and friendly relations between Spain and the United States for a period as long as statesmen are accustomed to foresee events."<sup>401</sup> Just how effective American pressure was in compelling Spain to withdraw from the Dominican Republic is difficult to determine. As Perry said:

It is not necessary to inquire whether the fall of Richmond may have had anything to do with this change of opinion in the original annexation party here, since the change is so evidently

<sup>398</sup> *Annual Cyclopaedia*, 1865.

<sup>399</sup> *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1865, pt. 2, 471. Perry to Seward, January 31, 1865.

<sup>400</sup> *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1865, pt. 2, 508. Seward to Perry, February 27, 1865.

<sup>401</sup> *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1865, pt. 2, 521. Seward to Perry, April 4, 1865.



counselled by the true interests of Spain herself. That event, however, had intervened.<sup>402</sup>

During the Civil War, Boyer's immigration scheme was revived because of President Lincoln's belief that the happiest solution for the negro problem was the exportation of the negroes to lands populated by men of their own race among whom they might enjoy liberty and equality of opportunity. High hopes were entertained in Haiti of the great stimulus to progress and prosperity to be derived from the influx of colored men from the United States. Boonneau writing in 1862, before the scheme had proved a failure, paints in glowing terms the future of the immigration movement. It is destined

to acquire very large proportions. Slavery, it is to be hoped, will soon be abolished in North America, and a host of negroes and mulattoes, becoming masters of their fate, will hasten to leave the United States, where color prejudices will long survive slavery, to enjoy in Haiti all the rights of free men and citizens. . . . Haiti will profit necessarily by this emancipation, and will be enriched by a population familiar with all the industries and arts which are practised in America. The civil war now raging in the United States shows us then, in the near future, that the resources of the republic will increase in a manner un-hoped-for, her commerce will be vastly extended, and her progress will be strongly accelerated, under the energetic impulsion of a largely increased class of mulattoes.<sup>403</sup>

The terms offered by the Haitian government show its eagerness for immigration. It offered religious freedom; free importation of machinery, agricultural implements, and the personal effects of the immigrants; citizenship after a residence of a year and a day in the country; and, for a time at least, free passage from the United States to Haiti.<sup>404</sup>

In 1862 the United States undertook the promotion of the movement and in April of that year, Congress passed a bill appropriating \$100,000 for the president's use in providing for the emigration of free men of color either to

<sup>402</sup> *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1865, pt. 2, 553. Perry to Seward, August 29, 1865.

<sup>403</sup> Bonneau, Haiti. *Ses Progrès—Son Avenir*, 107-108.

<sup>404</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1899, 401. Powell to Hay, August 14, 1899.

Haiti or Liberia.<sup>406</sup> The plan adopted by the president in Haiti was to encourage the settlement of Isle à Vache, which had already been granted by President Geffrard to an American promoter for that purpose.<sup>406</sup> Five hundred persons were taken over as an experiment but the result was a sad failure. It was difficult to break the virgin soil and get out the first crops, the negroes refused to work and their discontent was fostered by the Haitians who wanted the colonists to come over to Haiti. "After eight weary months of anxiety and expense," the colony was abandoned and those of the colonists who were still there and who desired it were relanded in the United States.<sup>407</sup> That ended governmental attempts at colonization in Haiti, though emigration has continued to the island and a large number of American negroes have, altogether, found new homes in the black republic.

In December, 1861, the presidential message asserted that there was no longer any good reason for withholding "recognition of the independence and sovereignty of Hayti and Liberia" and that therefore it was expedient to maintain a "chargé d'affaires near each of those new states."<sup>408</sup> To carry out the president's desire became the task of Charles Sumner, who constituted himself the guardian of Haitian interests. Against the opposition of the Committee on Foreign Relations, he reported into the Senate on February 4, 1862, a bill authorizing the diplomatic representation of the United States to Haiti and Liberia. He was the principal supporter of the bill, whose chief opponent was Garrett Davis of Kentucky.<sup>409</sup>

The arguments used were the same that long discussion of Haitian affairs had made familiar. For recognition, the principal argument was the commercial. With twenty-one countries of less commercial importance than Haiti the United States was already maintaining diplomatic rela-

<sup>406</sup> Mitchell, *Report of Colonization and Emigration*, 1.

<sup>406</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>407</sup> Tuckerman, *President Lincoln and Colonization*, 329-331.

<sup>408</sup> *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1861, 6.

<sup>409</sup> Pierce, *Memoirs and Letters of Charles Sumner*, iv, 69-70.

tions.<sup>410</sup> Among the countries with which the United States had commercial intercourse, Haiti held ninth rank in respect to tonnage; while, in 1851, Mexico with its population of 8,000,000 imported less by \$350,000 than Haiti.<sup>411</sup> To the pro-slavery party, on the other hand, the bill was a part of the policy which had contributed so largely to the severance of the Union, while the prospect of receiving black ministers was both ludicrous and distasteful. In spite of this slavery opposition, however, the bill was carried through both the Senate and the House and in June, 1862, the long struggle to secure recognition for the Black Republic was ended. In September, 1866, when Dominican independence was safely re-established, a similar step was taken in regard to the Dominican Republic.<sup>412</sup>

In 1865 the proposal was broached by Haiti that England, France, Spain and the United States should unite in guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Santo Domingo, making of it an American Switzerland. In February, 1865, Mr. Madiou, the Haitian minister at Madrid approached the Spanish government on the subject; but Spain was "determined to listen to no proposition, take no step at all referring to any part of America, except the Spanish colonies of Cuba and Porto Rico, without counting beforehand on a good understanding with the United States," so well had she learned the lesson from the French intervention in Mexico and her own intervention in the Dominican Republic.<sup>413</sup>

Seward, in reply, was pleased with "any determination that might be adopted by European maritime powers to assure the independence of the people existing upon the island of San Domingo" but he was unwilling to enter into any entangling alliance.<sup>414</sup> Since the "agreement of the United States to the project was the one thing essential

<sup>410</sup> 37 Cong., 2 Sess., Cong. Globe, 1774.

<sup>411</sup> *Report of the Select Committee on Emancipation and Colonization*, 29.

<sup>412</sup> Moore, *Digest of International Law*, i, 107.

<sup>413</sup> *Diplomatic Relations*, 1865, pt. 2, 514. Perry to Seward, March 11, 1865.

<sup>414</sup> *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1865, pt. 2, 522. Seward to Perry, April 4, 1865.

on which the success of the whole project hinged" and since this was lacking, the European nations were unwilling to take any steps in the matter.<sup>415</sup> In August, 1865, Seward, in a long explanatory note to Sir Frederick Bruce, English minister at Washington, reiterated his position that, while the United States would be very glad to have the European nations promise to refrain from making further attempts upon the independence of Santo Domingo, she was unwilling to make any such promise herself or to take any steps which would lead to political relations with foreign nations.<sup>416</sup> So ended the attempt of Haiti to put the independence of the island on a secure basis. A few months later the second period of American endeavor to annex the Dominican Republic began and all thought of neutralization was, of course, at an end.

With the conclusion of the American Civil War, removing slavery as a dominant factor in determining American foreign policy and with the establishment of a regular diplomatic agency in Santo Domingo, the relations between the United States and the island of Santo Domingo entered upon a new phase. The interest, which had existed for more than a century and a half, has continued to the present. Trade relations still bind the two countries together as they did in the opening years of the eighteenth century while the strategic importance of the island to the United States has grown steadily stronger.

In summary, the history of American relations with the island of Santo Domingo might be divided into three main periods. In the first, covering the whole of the eighteenth century, the interest of the United States in the West India island was mainly commercial, and the energies of both countries were devoted to securing the freest trade relations possible. In the second period, comprised within the years 1800 and 1862, American policy was determined largely by the slavery interests to whom the American

<sup>415</sup> *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1865, pt. 2, 537. Perry to Seward, May 12, 1865.

<sup>416</sup> *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1865, pt. 2, 195. Seward to Bruce, August 15, 1865.

attitude toward Santo Domingo seemed of vital importance. During the first half of the period, when the island was under avowed negro rule, the Southern attitude prevented any open recognition of the Black Republic. During the second half of the period, Northern and Southern attitude were reversed, the South favoring either the recognition or annexation of the Dominican Republic, while the North opposed the step because of the extension it would give to the influence of the slavery party.

In the most recent period, questions of commerce and race have become secondary. The determining factor in this period has been a growing realization of the strategic importance to the United States of control of the Caribbean and of the danger to American interests of European dominance there. It is that realization which has lead the United States repeatedly to oppose any extension of French, English or German influence in Santo Domingo and which has finally induced the American government to extend a virtual protectorate over the island.

## CHAPTER X

### BIBLIOGRAPHY

While the literature dealing with the island of Santo Domingo from its discovery to the present time is voluminous, references bearing upon the particular subject of this thesis, the relations existing between the United States and Santo Domingo, are comparatively rare and scattered through a mass of irrelevant material. Much of the literature, too, especially that treating of the history of the island since its independence is written from a partisan point of view and is so prejudiced as to be almost valueless.

The subject of the trade relations existing between the North American colonies and the French West Indies during the eighteenth century has not as yet received adequate treatment. Professor Mims of Yale, who has made a good beginning in his study of Colbert's *West India Policy*, has promised to complete his presentation of the subject. In the meantime, the best work done in the field has been

that of Professor Channing in the second and third volumes of his *History of the United States*, and more in detail by Professor Beer, in his *British Colonial Policy 1754-1765*, for the period of the French War. A good deal of material from French sources needs yet to be examined. Déschamps in his *Histoire de la Question Coloniale en France*, treats of the reaction in France to the various changes made in colonial policy in the West Indies. For the colonial point of view, Hilliard d'Auberteuil's *Considérations sur l'État Présent de la Colonie française de Saint-Domingue* and the *Lettres Critiques et Politiques sur Les Colonies and Le Commerce des villes maritimes de France*, attributed to Dubuisson and Dubucq, give the arguments advanced, toward the end of the century, by the French Creoles in favor of free trade between the colonies and foreign nations.

Books dealing with the French Revolution in Santo Domingo are innumerable. In English, of the secondary authorities dealing with the subject in a general way, the best are Mills, *The Early Years of the French Revolution in San Domingo*, and more recently Stoddard, *The French Revolution in San Domingo*, whose account, based on French archival material, is not only scholarly and authoritative but charmingly written. Most of the literature dealing with the period is, however, written from the French point of view and as the part played by the United States was comparatively unimportant, it has received little attention.

The only secondary authority who has treated at any length the interaction between the United States and Santo Domingo during the period of the French Revolution and more particularly the Napoleonic era, is Henry Adams, who, in his *History of the United States*, has described in brilliant fashion the effect upon American history of the career of Toussaint Louverture and has supplemented this in his *Historical Essays* by a study of Napoleon's policy in Santo Domingo with special reference to its bearing upon the United States. A less brilliant but more balanced study of Napoleon's colonial policy, without any special emphasis on its relation to American history, is to be found in Roloff's *Die Kolonialpolitik Napoleons I*, a schol-

arly piece of investigation based on French archival material.

Important among the primary sources for a knowledge of the American attitude toward the revolutionary movement in Santo Domingo are the writings of certain American statesmen, particularly Jefferson, John Adams, Hamilton, Rufus King, the letters of Oliver Wolcott, given in Gibbs' *Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and John Adams*, and the letters exchanged between John Quincy Adams and William Vans Murray from 1797 to 1803. The diplomatic correspondence between the French ministers and the American government in the *American State Papers* throws a good deal of light upon the earlier period of the Revolution. But much more valuable is the correspondence of the French ministers with the home government published in the report of the American Historical Association for 1903 and edited by Professor Turner, who has done so much to make clear the relations between the United States and France during the last decade of the eighteenth century.

For a history of the French refugees during the critical first year, 1793, in the United States, a good deal of material is to be found in the *Débats enter les accusateurs et les accusés, dans l'affaire des colonies*. This is a record of the trial of Sonthonax, Civil Commissioner to Santo Domingo, on charges of misgovernment brought against him by the French refugees in the United States. To clear himself, he brought countercharges against the refugees in regard to their activities directed against the French government during their residence in the United States. Garran-Coulon in his official *Rapport sur les Troubles de Saint-Domingue*, makes use of much of the same material, though decidedly prejudiced in favor of the Commissioners and against the colonists. A little additional material on the organization of the refugees in the United States is to be found in a pamphlet entitled *Conspirations, Trahisons et Calomnies dévoilées et dénoncées par plus de mille Français Réfugiés au Continent de l'Amérique*, which contains a summary of the charges against Sonthonax and Genet.



A more sympathetic account of the life of the French refugees is to be found scattered through the pages of Moreau de Saint-Méry's *Voyage aux États-Unis de l'Amérique, 1793-1798*. Himself a West Indian Creole and long a resident in Santo Domingo, he came in contact with a great many of the distressed exiles in his travels through the United States and his residence at Philadelphia. Of the position of American merchants in Santo Domingo during the early days of the Revolution, a clear idea can be gained from the *Reminiscences of the Insurrection in St. Domingo* by Samuel G. Perkins, a young Boston merchant, resident at Cap Français from 1785 until its destruction in 1793.

Of histories of Haiti since its independence there are none that are satisfactory; while the only attempt to deal with the relations between the United States and Haiti is in a brief article by Professor Paxson on the Tripartite Intervention in Hayti, prefaced by a still briefer résumé of American-Haitian relations during the preceding fifty years. For a brief sketch of the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, the most nearly satisfactory is a chapter *In Haiti, or the Black Republic*, by Sir Spenser St. John, long resident in Port au Prince as British minister. American accounts, such as Hazard's *Santo Domingo Past and Present*, are apt to be the work of newspaper correspondents or casual visitors to the island. The awakening of German interest in Santo Domingo is shown by the publication in 1860 of a *History of Haiti* by Heinrich Handelmann, professor of history at Kiel University, which is particularly good for French, English and American intrigues in Santo Domingo during the forties and fifties. Haitian historians are apt to be prejudiced especially by color considerations. The most recent history from a Haitian source, by Léger, long Haitian minister at Washington, is a piece of special pleading designed to produce a favorable impression of Haitian history upon the American public.

Of contemporary writers during the forties and fifties, the most important are Gustave d'Alaux, whom Hunt states is Maxime Raybaud, French consul-general at Port au

Prince; Britannicus, a pseudonym for Theodore Heneken, British agent in the Dominican Republic during the forties; Lepelletier de Saint-Remy; B. C. Clark, selected by the Haitians as their consular agent in the United States; and Benjamin P. Hunt, an American merchant long resident in Santo Domingo, whose collection of Haitian material forms the basis of the collection in the Boston Public Library. All of them must be used with more or less care. Three of the American agents to the Dominican Republic, Porter, Walsh and Cazneau, have also written popular accounts of their missions in addition to their diplomatic correspondence.

American archival material in regard to Haiti before 1860 is not very extensive. The earliest material is a packet entitled *Distressed Emigrants from St. Domingo*, dated 1794, and throwing a little light on the condition of the French refugees in the United States and the steps taken by the American government to aid them. The most important sources of material are the consular letters which begin for Cape Haytien in 1797, for Port au Prince in 1835, and for Santo Domingo City in 1837. For the earliest years Mr. Jameson has published in the *American Historical Review*, vol. xvi, 64-101, the most important letters written by Dr. Edward Stevens during his residence as American consul-general at Cap Français. In addition there are in the State Department archives a large number of letters from Tobias Lear, Stevens' successor, during the two years he was permitted to remain in the island. The consular material is disappointing because of the considerable gaps, especially during the earlier years, and because little space is devoted to political conditions; but it nevertheless offers the most abundant material for the first half of the nineteenth century. The archives also contain the reports made by Cazneau on his special missions to Santo Domingo, which have not been published.

Of the published government documents, the most important are: 27 Cong., 3 sess., House Doc. 36, which deals with Haitian claims and gives a good deal of diplomatic correspondence from 1817 on to the thirties; 33 Cong., 1

sess., Sen. Doc. 12, which gives the diplomatic correspondence of Benjamin E. Green during his mission to Santo Domingo: 32 Cong., 1 sess., Sen. Doc. 113, the report of Walsh during the tripartite intervention; and 41 Cong., 3 sess., Sen. Doc. 17, which contains considerable material bearing on the earlier history of Haiti and diplomatic correspondence from 1845 on, not published elsewhere.

Because of the scantiness of other source material, newspaper and periodical literature is of especial value. Of the Haitian newspapers, an early file is that of the *Moniteur Générale de la partie française de Saint-Domingue* for the period from February to June, 1793, to be found in the library of the American Antiquarian Society. Of later newspapers the Boston Public Library has a number of files belonging to the Hunt collection, but most of them, such as *Le Propagateur Haitien*, *L'Opinion Nationale*, *La République*, contain only a few numbers. The *Feuille de Commerce* is more nearly complete but contains little of interest politically.

American newspapers furnish more material. Two French newspapers published in the United States are of value; the *Courrier de la France et ses Colonies*, published from October 15, 1795 to March 14, 1796, for the French refugees; and the *Courrier des États-Unis*, which appeared during the early nineteenth century and was especially interested in French affairs. The *General Advertiser*, Philadelphia, of which a very extensive file from 1790 to 1800 is preserved in the library of the American Antiquarian Society, contains a great many references to Santo Domingan affairs. More scattering files of other papers, such as the *New York Journal* and *Patriotic Register*, and the *Pennsylvania Packet* were also found of value. *Niles's Register* is invaluable for the first half of the nineteenth century, while the discussion by Horace Greeley in the *New York Tribune* of Cazneau's mission throws considerable light upon the anti-slavery attitude toward the annexation project of 1854.

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